

UNIT-V

Game Theory

- Business Situation involves competition.
- Effective decision making is plays a vital role in such situations.

Decision making Situations!

- ① Deterministic - The problem data representing the situation are constants.
- ② Probabilistic - Do not remain constant. Vary due to chance and represent as some probability distribution.
- ③ Uncertainty } Data subjected to variance and it is not in the probability distribution.

Pure Strategy!

If a player selects a Particular Strategy with a probability of 1, then that strategy is known as Pure Strategy. Ignore the remaining strategies.

Mixed Strategy!

If a player follows more than one Strategy, then that strategy is known as mixed Strategy. But the probability will be less than one.

Maximini Principle:

The principle maximizes the minimum guaranteed gains of a player A. The minimum gains with respect to different alternatives of 'A'. The maximum of these minimum gains is known as maximini value.

Minimax Principle:

The principle minimizes the maximum losses with respect to different alternatives of player B. The minimum of these maximum losses is known as minimax value.

Saddle Point:

In a game, if the maximini value is equal to the minimax value, then the game is said to have a saddle point. The intersecting cell corresponding to these values is known as saddle point.

If the game has a Saddle Point, then each player has a pure strategy.

Example:

		Player B			Row minimum
		1	2	3	
Player A	1	20	15	22	15
	2	35	45	40	35 — Maximin
	3	18	20	25	18

Column maximum $\begin{pmatrix} 35 & 45 & 40 \end{pmatrix}$
 Minimax

Minimax = 35 ; Maximin = 35

\therefore Saddle Point = (35, 35)

Value of the game is $V=35$

Game with mixed Strategy: (2x2 matrix)

		B		addments
		1	2	
A	1	a	b	c-d
	2	c	d	a-b

$p_1 = \frac{ c-d }{ a-b + c-d }$	$q_1 = \frac{ b-d }{ b-d + a-c }$	$V = \frac{a c-d + e a-b }{ a-b + c-d }$
$p_2 = \frac{ a-b }{ a-b + c-d }$	$q_2 = \frac{ a-c }{ b-d + a-c }$	

Example

Solve the following 2x2 game

		1	2
A	1	6	9
	2	8	4

Game to
solve by
matrix
method

Solution:

		B		
		1	2	
A	1	6	9	(b) - Maximize
	2	8	4	4

Minimize (a) 9

The pay off matrix has no saddle point. Therefore go for mixed strategy.

		B		
		1	2	oddments
A	1	6	9	4 (c-d)
	2	8	4	3 (a-b)

oddments 5 2
(b-d) (a-c)

$$P_1 = \frac{4}{4+3} = \frac{4}{7}$$

$$P_2 = \frac{3}{4+3} = \frac{3}{7}$$

$$Q_1 = \frac{5}{5+2} = \frac{5}{7}$$

$$Q_2 = \frac{2}{5+2} = \frac{2}{7}$$

$$V = \frac{6(4) + 8(3)}{3+4}$$

$$\Rightarrow V = \frac{48}{7}$$

Strategy of A is $(\frac{4}{7}, \frac{3}{7})$

B is $(\frac{5}{7}, \frac{2}{7})$

and $V = \frac{48}{7}$

Arithmetic method: $[n \times n \text{ matrix}]$

① Solve the following 3×3 game.

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Player A} \\ \text{Player B} \end{array} \begin{bmatrix} 3 & -1 & -3 \\ -3 & 3 & -1 \\ -4 & -3 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$$

Step-①:

Column matrix, $C = \begin{bmatrix} 3-6 & -1+3 \\ 4 & 2 \\ -6 & 4 \\ -1 & -6 \end{bmatrix}$

Step-②:

Row matrix, $R = \begin{bmatrix} 6 & -4 & -2 \\ 1 & 6 & -4 \end{bmatrix}$

Step-③:

Magnitude, $|C_1| = \begin{vmatrix} -6 & 4 \\ -1 & -6 \end{vmatrix} = 36 - (-4) = 40$

$$|C_2| = \begin{vmatrix} 4 & 2 \\ -1 & -6 \end{vmatrix} = -22$$

$$|C_3| = \begin{vmatrix} 4 & 2 \\ -6 & 4 \end{vmatrix} = 28$$

$$|R_1| = \begin{vmatrix} -4 & -2 \\ 6 & -4 \end{vmatrix} = 28$$

$$|R_2| = \begin{vmatrix} 6 & -2 \\ 1 & -4 \end{vmatrix} = -22$$

$$|R_3| = \begin{vmatrix} 6 & -4 \\ 1 & 6 \end{vmatrix} = 40$$

Step-④: Augmented Payoff matrix

				Row oddments
				40
				22
				28
A	$\begin{bmatrix} 3 & -1 & -3 \\ -3 & 3 & -1 \\ -4 & -3 & 3 \end{bmatrix}$			
Column oddments	28	22	40	$\boxed{90}$

Step-⑤: (Strategy)

Row Player A : $\left(\frac{40}{90}, \frac{22}{90}, \frac{28}{90} \right)$

$\therefore \left(\frac{4}{9}, \frac{11}{45}, \frac{14}{45} \right)$

Column Player B : $\left(\frac{28}{90}, \frac{22}{90}, \frac{40}{90} \right)$

$\therefore \left(\frac{14}{45}, \frac{11}{45}, \frac{4}{9} \right)$

Step-⑥: (Value)

$$V = \frac{4}{9} \times 3 + \frac{11}{45} \times -3 + \frac{14}{45} \times -4$$

$\Rightarrow \boxed{V = -\frac{29}{45}}$

$$V = \frac{14}{45} \times 3 + \frac{11}{45} \times -1 + \frac{4}{9} \times -3$$

$\Rightarrow \boxed{V = -\frac{29}{45}}$

② For the Payoff matrix given below, decide the optimum strategies for A & B.

$$A \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} 1 & 2 \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 6 & 9 \\ 8 & 4 \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

Solution:

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} -3 \\ +4 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$R = \begin{bmatrix} -2 \\ +5 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$|C_1| = +4$$

$$|R_1| = +5$$

$$|C_2| = -3$$

$$|R_2| = -2$$

Augmented Payoff matrix } $A \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} 1 & 2 \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 6 & 9 \\ 8 & 4 \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix} \begin{matrix} +4 \\ 3 \end{matrix}$

$\begin{matrix} 5 & 2 \end{matrix} \boxed{7}$

Strategy for B : $\left(\frac{5}{7}, \frac{2}{7}\right)$

Strategy for A : $\left(\frac{4}{7}, \frac{3}{7}\right)$

Value, $V = \frac{4}{7} \times 6 + \frac{3}{7} \times 8$

$$\Rightarrow \boxed{V = \frac{48}{7}}$$

$$V = \frac{5}{7} \times 6 + \frac{2}{7} \times 9$$

$$\Rightarrow \boxed{V = \frac{48}{7}}$$

③ Solve Game

$$A = \begin{matrix} & \begin{matrix} I & II & III \end{matrix} \\ \begin{matrix} I \\ II \\ III \end{matrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 7 & 2 \\ 6 & 2 & 7 \\ 6 & 1 & 6 \end{bmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

Solution:

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} -6 & 5 \\ 4 & -5 \\ 5 & -5 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$R = \begin{bmatrix} -5 & 5 & -5 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$C_1 = \begin{vmatrix} 4 & -5 \\ 5 & -5 \end{vmatrix} = 5$$

$$R_1 = \begin{vmatrix} 5 & -5 \\ 1 & 1 \end{vmatrix} = 10$$

$$C_2 = \begin{vmatrix} -6 & 5 \\ 5 & -5 \end{vmatrix} = 5$$

$$R_2 = \begin{vmatrix} 5 & -5 \\ 0 & 1 \end{vmatrix} = -5$$

$$C_3 = \begin{vmatrix} -6 & 5 \\ 4 & -5 \end{vmatrix} = 10$$

$$R_3 = \begin{vmatrix} -5 & 5 \\ 0 & 1 \end{vmatrix} = -5$$

Augmented matrix,

oddmens

1	7	2
6	2	7
6	1	6

5

5

10

oddmens

10

5

5

20

Optimum Strategies are:

$$\text{Player A : } \left(\frac{5}{20}, \frac{5}{20}, \frac{10}{20} \right)$$

$$: \left(\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{2} \right)$$

$$\text{Player B : } \left(\frac{10}{20}, \frac{5}{20}, \frac{5}{20} \right)$$

$$: \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4} \right)$$

$$\text{Value} = \frac{1}{4} \times 1 + \frac{1}{4} \times 6 + \frac{1}{2} \times 6$$

$$V = \frac{19}{4}$$

Dominance Property:

In some games, it is possible to reduce the size of the payoff matrix by eliminating the redundant rows (or columns). If a game has such redundant rows (or columns), those rows are dominated by other rows. Such property is known as dominance property.

Dominance Property for Rows:

a) If all the entries in a Row (X) ^{are} greater than (or) equal to the corresponding entries of another Row (Y), then Row (Y) is dominated by Row (X).
Under such situation Row (Y) is deleted.

b) If sum of the any two rows (Row X + Row Y) is greater than (or) equal to the third row (Row Z) then Row Z is dominated by Row X + Y.
Under such situation Row Z is deleted.

$$\text{Row } X \geq \text{Row } Y \Rightarrow \text{Row } Y \text{ is deleted}$$

$$\text{Row } X + \text{Row } Y \geq \text{Row } Z \Rightarrow \text{Row } Z \text{ is deleted}$$

Dominance Property for Columns:

$$\text{Column } X \leq \text{Column } Y \Rightarrow \text{Column } Y \text{ is deleted}$$

$$\text{Column } X + \text{Column } Y \leq \text{Column } Z \Rightarrow \text{Column } Z \text{ is deleted}$$

① Solve the following 3×3 game.

		B		
		I	II	III
A	I	1	7	2
	II	6	2	7
	III	6	1	6

Solution:

		B			
		I	II	III	Minimum
A	I	1	7	2	1
	II	6	2	7	(2) Maximin
	III	6	1	6	1
	Maximum	(6)	7	7	
		Minimum			

Maximin \neq Minimax

\therefore There is no saddle point.

Check for dominance property.

Row III is dominated by Row II. \therefore Row III is removed.

		I	II	III
A	I	1	7	2
	II	6	2	7

Column III is dominated by Column I. \therefore Column III is removed.

		B	
		I	II
A	I	1	7
	II	6	2

$P = V$

Column matrix, $C = \begin{bmatrix} -6 \\ 4 \end{bmatrix}$

Row matrix, $R = \begin{bmatrix} -5 & 5 \end{bmatrix}$

Magnitude,

$$|C_1| = 4$$

$$|R_1| = 5$$

$$|C_2| = 6$$

$$|R_2| = 5$$

Augmented Payoff matrix,

		B		
		I	II	
A	I	1	7	4
	II	6	2	6
		5	5	10

Optimum Strategy,

$$\text{Player A: } \left(\frac{4}{10}, \frac{6}{10} \right) \Rightarrow \left(\frac{2}{5}, \frac{3}{5} \right)$$

$$\text{Player B: } \left(\frac{5}{10}, \frac{5}{10} \right) \Rightarrow \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2} \right)$$

Value of game,

$$V = \frac{2}{5} \times 1 + \frac{3}{5} \times 6$$

$$\Rightarrow \boxed{V = 4}$$